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Foreign Posture in Comparative Perspective: A Quantitative and 
Qualitative Appraisal of Italian Foreign and Defence Policy during the 
Renzi Government 
 
Abstract 
 
The performance of the Renzi government (2014-2016) in the realm of foreign 
and defence policy is a mixed bag. Struggling with significant structural 
constraints at home but called upon to shoulder increased responsibilities 
abroad, Italian foreign policy (IFP) has balanced instances of retrenchment, 
characterised by inward-looking tendencies and continued budget shortfalls, 
with its traditional emphasis on bandwagoning with stronger allies to retain a 
degree of influence over international events. Secondary only to Italy’s 
traditional focus on the European project and the broader North Atlantic 
Alliance, the Mediterranean pillar – including the fight against extremism and the 
search for new markets and economic opportunities – has dominated IFP under 
the Renzi government. While staying true to its traditional reluctance to ‘go it 
alone’, Italy has pushed hard in Europe to consolidate a common response to the 
migration crisis, while seeking to assume a leading role in efforts to support 
political reconciliation in Libya. Italy has also enhanced its participation in the 
US-led anti-ISIS coalition, but has to date refused repeated requests by the US 
and its allies to begin offensive military operations in Syria and Iraq. The article 
analyses Italian foreign and defence policy from a comparative perspective, 
employing a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of Italy’s foreign posture between 2014 and 2016.   
 
 
Keywords: Italy; foreign policy; defence; government; Renzi. 
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Introduction 
 
Following a prolonged period of political uncertainty caused by the global 
financial downturn and subsequent Eurozone crisis, a new Italian government 
dominated by the centre-left Democratic Party (PD) was sworn in on 22 
February 2014. Led by the charismatic former mayor of Florence and PD 
secretary, Matteo Renzi, the government presented a programme of ambitious 
domestic reforms, most notably in the institutional and economic domains, but 
also including proposals aimed at reorganising and improving the effectiveness 
of Italy’s foreign and defence policy in light of dwindling resources and stringent 
fiscal constraints.  
 
Coming on the heels of technocratic and ‘grand coalition’ governments led by 
Mario Monti (2011-13) and Enrico Letta (2013-14) respectively, the Renzi 
cabinet benefitted from consolidated support in Parliament and a clearer 
political mandate to act in foreign and security affairs. Holding office thanks to an 
alliance with a number of smaller centre-right and independent parties, Renzi’s 
PD remained the largest and most influential party in the government, staffing a 
number of key posts, including the offices of Foreign Affairs and Defence.  
 
As the youngest Prime Minister in Italy’s history, Matteo Renzi, aged 39 at the 
time of his appointment, enjoyed high standing in opinion polls, with 56% of 
Italians expressing a positive view of the new executive upon his taking office in 
February 2014 (source: Demos & Pi 2014). While not having a direct electoral 
mandate – Renzi assumed the premiership through Machiavellian political 
manoeuvres which saw him replace the former Prime Minister and fellow PD 
member Enrico Letta – Renzi subsequently campaigned hard during the May 
2014 European Parliament elections, leading his party to secure the highest 
number of votes. Largely viewed as a vote of confidence in the Renzi 
government, the outcome – with the PD securing 40.8% of the vote – brought a 
significant boost in Renzi’s popularity, which reached a peak of 69% directly 
following the elections (source: Demos & Pi 2014). 
 
During his three years in office, Renzi was confronted with a long series of 
international challenges. These ranged from the worsening refugee and migrant 
crisis, continued turmoil and violence in Libya and Ukraine, the advent of so-
called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS, ISIL or Daesh) and a 
mounting string of terrorist attacks in Europe and beyond. On top of these 
challenges, Italy was also engaged in a number of on-going international military 
missions, commitments that span various governments and were reaffirmed by 
Renzi. These included Italy’s participation in the NATO-led mission in 
Afghanistan, its active contribution to the UN UNIFIL mission in Lebanon – which 
an Italian general, Luciano Portolano, commanded for two years between 2014-
2016 – anti-piracy and anti-smuggling naval missions in the Horn of Africa and 
the Mediterranean and its continued commitment to the Balkans in a variety of 
EU and NATO support missions. In total, Italy was contributing to 29 
international military missions in December 2016 with approximately 6,750 
personnel (source: Italian Ministry of Defence) and a number of important 
 3 
command positions in multilateral military missions abroad (in 2013 the 
number was 25).1 
 
As a ‘middle-ranking’ power that has traditionally suffered from a sort of 
‘inferiority complex’ vis-à-vis the big three European powers of Germany, France 
and the UK, Italy has seen its participation in international missions as a means 
of increasing its international visibility and profile (Carbone 2011; Davidson 
2011). It has traditionally aligned its policies with those of larger allies, the 
United States in primis, in the attempt to hedge against excessive risks, while 
seeking to maximise returns (Davidson 2011). This has provided Italy with an 
avenue to promote its interests and enhance its standing on the world stage, 
making the country an important force contributor to UN, EU, NATO and US-led 
‘coalition-of-the-willing’ missions (Ignazi, Giacomello, and Coticchia 2012). 
However, even within these missions, as in the more general diplomatic and 
political sphere, Italy has rarely raised its voice and spoken out of turn, even 
when disagreeing with partners and allies on important issues (Giacomello and 
Verbeek 2011).  
 
In this context, Renzi’s government remained true to Italy’s multilateral vocation, 
its action conditional upon not being confronted with a united front of countries 
thinking the opposite. An explicit request from recognised political authorities or 
a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution remains the sine 
qua non for Italian military intervention abroad. This has lead Renzi to refuse US 
requests to begin military action against ISIS in Syria, while agreeing to increase 
Italy’s participation in the anti-ISIS coalition active in Iraq and neighbouring 
states. In the EU, Italy has traditionally considered European unity on foreign 
policy issues an important objective, and has generally avoided taking public 
positions that would break the fragile EU consensus. This was the case with the 
issue of imposing and renewing sanctions on Russia. After some diplomatic 
scuttling and protests in late 2015 (“Gentiloni: La Ue” 2014, 7; “Gentiloni: 
dialogo” 2015, 3), the Renzi government eventually backed down, realigning 
itself with the EU position and in particular with those of France and Germany 
(ECFR 2016, 49-52; “Mogherini: È con le sanzioni” 2014, 10; “Bruxelles rinnova” 
2016, 14; see also Olmastroni 2014). 
 
By carefully balancing quantitative and qualitative analysis and performing a 
comparative assessment of Italy’s foreign posture between 2014 and 2016, this 
article examines Renzi’s foreign and defence policy, also reflecting on its 
performance as compared with previous executives. The multidisciplinary 
approach will be key. In order fully to evaluate Italy’s foreign policy (IFP) during 
the Renzi government we will discuss the country’s capabilities and actions in 
the more general context of crisis and uncertainty gripping the international 
system as a whole. To this end, IFP will be quantitatively and qualitatively 
compared to that of other large EU member states – namely France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom – in terms of hard and soft power. 
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Italy’s Foreign Posture in an Uncertain World 
 
The economic and migration crises, Brexit, a slowdown in European integration 
and the rise of populist and nationalist political forces have contributed to 
general inward-looking trends across Europe and the US. Public weariness with 
drawn-out international and multilateral initiatives, particularly of a military 
nature (Conetta 2014; Pew Research Center 2016a, 2016b), has spilled over into 
politics, strengthening these trends and contributing to a more general decline of 
internationally mandated UN, NATO or EU missions. The difference is 
particularly striking if one thinks back to the 1990s, the heyday of liberal 
interventionism. As observed in a previous study (Olmastroni 2014), the 
paradox is that these general trends are occurring precisely at a time when more 
needs to be done collectively and multilaterally in response to major 
international challenges and threats. From climate change to migration, Syria, a 
resurgent Russia, European recovery and tensions in the South China Sea, multi-
lateral action alone can hope to counter the increasingly convoluted and 
antagonistic nature of the international system (European External Action 
Service 2016a; de Hoop Scheffer et al. 2016). The general international context, 
however, is one in which short-term domestic political interests and crude 
material calculations have returned to dominate the national capitals of major 
states, undermining cooperation and accentuating differences and 
disagreements between major players (Rachman 2016; Cha 2016; de Waal 
2016). 
 
With respect to these inward-looking trends, Italy is no different from its 
neighbours. Italy, however, is particularly exposed to a number of the most 
pressing international challenges. This has left the Renzi government little choice 
than to assume new responsibilities in its immediate neighbourhood, especially 
in the Mediterranean. While domestic constraints of a political and economic 
nature have continued to hamper Italy’s international action, the Renzi 
government has not shied away from enhancing its contribution, both military 
and diplomatic, in a number of important theatres. In this respect, Italy – like 
other European countries of a similar stature – has desperately tried to ‘do more 
with less’, seeking to reorganise its ministries and strategies, and focus its 
limited resources and political leverage on those areas of most immediate 
concern to Italian national interests. 
 
Within this framework, the Renzi government oversaw a long overdue process of 
legislative reform in the realm of Italian foreign and defence policy. In April 
2015, a White Paper for International Security and Defence, drafted by Italy’s 
Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti, was released. Besides aiming at the 
reorganisation of the defence budget (see next section for details), it engages in a 
forward-looking exercise meant to elucidate the country’s strategic interests and 
improve Italy’s diplomatic and military preparedness, particularly in the 
Mediterranean (Marrone and Camporini 2016; 2-3)2. A further example is given 
by an important amendment (Art. 7 bis) made to law 198/2015 governing Italy’s 
participation in military missions abroad. Approved in December 2015, the 
legislation sought to reaffirm Italy’s participation in on-going international 
missions and enhance the Government’s ability to support political and strategic 
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objectives militarily. Mirroring a more general international trend which has 
seen the concentration of decision-making power in the military realm in the 
hands of the executive, the amendment allows the Prime Minister to dispatch 
limited numbers of Special Forces to support intelligence operations and protect 
Italian nationals or strategic interests abroad with a rather limited degree of 
parliamentary oversight (Ronzitti 2016).  
 
The amendment was subsequently used to dispatch Special Forces and 
intelligence officials to Libya, a major theatre of Italian military and diplomatic 
involvement under Renzi (“Intervento italiano” 2016). This was a political 
decision meant to enhance Italy’s credentials as an active contributor in the 
Mediterranean, providing the executive with a greater degree of freedom to act 
in the intelligence and security realm. As such, it represented a signal by the 
Renzi government of its willingness to shoulder some of the burden of these 
challenges, in turn presumably bestowing on Italy greater credibility and 
influence over international debates in these settings.  
 
The Renzi government also launched a broader legislative initiative aimed at 
reviewing official guidelines governing Italy’s participation in international 
military missions. The first comprehensive review of Italy’s legal and political 
mechanisms since 1982, the date of Italy’s first post-war foreign military 
engagement, in the context of the French-Italian-US dispatch of peacekeepers to 
Lebanon, the legislative proposal (L. 145/2016) was approved in July 2016 and 
formally entered into force on 1 January 2017 (Ronzitti 2017). Taken together, 
these initiatives demonstrate an increased understanding – and urgency – on the 
part of Italy’s political and military leadership of the need to oversee a 
comprehensive review of Italian foreign and defence policy with an eye to 
improving performance in times of limited resources and enhanced international 
uncertainty.  
  
The nature and results of these and other efforts will be assessed in the sections 
below. These trends will be tested and analysed by combining quantitative 
measurements of Italy’s defence, foreign policy and international cooperation 
budgets, participation in international missions abroad and the number of 
personnel deployed therein, with a qualitative analysis of the Renzi 
government’s diplomatic and political contributions to important international 
issues. While the Renzi government’s showing in foreign and defence policy 
remains a mixed bag, characterised by elements of continuity and change, a clear 
and more grounded assessment of it will emerge from the analysis below. 
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The Force Compared: Defence, Foreign-Policy Spending and Military 
Personnel in Operations Abroad  
 
Italy’s defence budgets have constantly shrunk in the last decade. It has been 
observed elsewhere that this decline began before the recent economic crisis and 
has continued beyond it (Olmastroni 2014). It has not been determined, 
however, whether it occurred at the same pace in other European countries. By 
comparing levels of defence expenditures in nominal and real terms, Figure 1 not 
only shows that Italy noticeably ranks below France, Germany3 and the UK, but it 
also depicts a steady and specific decrease in Italy’s overall defence budget 
between 2008 and 2015 (from 1.4% to 1.1% of GDP at 2010 prices). While 
defence spending also fell in France and the UK at the beginning of the 2008 
recession, these countries show either a stable trend (i.e., France) or a partial 
recovery (i.e., United Kingdom) in the 2010-2014 period. Only in 2015 did the 
countries under observation exhibit substantial cuts to their nominal (not real) 
budgets, partially offset by positive variations the following year (see also 
Marrone, De France and Fattibene 2016). 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In this context, the Renzi government marked a marginal but significant 
departure from its predecessors, with the largest increase in defence 
expenditure since 2008 (Figure 2). Although it remains to be seen whether the 
recent upward turn (+10.6% based on NATO estimates at constant 2010 prices) 
will be sustained over the next few years, what is certain is that a reform aimed 
both at balancing resources and at improving the efficiency of Italy’s armed 
forces is underway. As part of a process of reorganisation of the whole defence 
sector initiated in 2012 (law 244/2012 entered into force on 31 January 2013) 
and intensified after the publication of Minister of Defence Roberta Pinotti’s 
White Paper for International Security and Defence (April 2015), the Renzi 
government significantly improved the allocation of resources to align with 
other European and NATO countries. As shown in Figure 3, a reduction in 
personnel costs – still high if compared with those of Italy’s largest European 
allies – was accompanied by an increase in equipment costs and the strategic 
goal of a drastic reduction of the permanent staff from 88% to 50% of the whole 
military personnel (Pinotti 2015)4. While providing the Armed Forces with the 
resources, infrastructure and operational means to effectively address short and 
medium-term challenges, a similar reform is intended to establish an integrated 
defence system that would be more cost effective and oriented towards the 
internationalisation of military capabilities (Pinotti 2015). Implementation of the 
reform package announced in the White Paper has been slow however (Marrone 
and Camporini 2016), and it was not until 10 February 2017 that the 
Government approved a law outlining a road map for its enactment (“Approvato 
il decreto” 2017). 
 
 [FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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If a comprehensive reform process was therefore initiated in the defence sector, 
a longitudinal comparative investigation of resources allotted to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) reveals a less 
optimistic picture. As for the first, Figure 4 shows that both the nominal budget 
and the percentage of GDP earmarked for the Italian MFA net of ODA have slowly 
but steadily shrunk in the period spanning Italy’s last two legislatures. This trend 
conflicts with the ones observed in countries such as France and Germany, 
where expenditure for foreign affairs not only remained higher but also 
increased. And while a comparison with the UK, whose nominal spending has 
fluctuated to a significant degree, seems to depict a similar (if not harsher) trend, 
the cross-country evaluation is completely unbalanced when we examine their 
ODA in absolute and relative terms. The British aid budget is far higher than the 
Italian one, the UK being the first G20 country to achieve the UN target of 
contributing 0.7 per cent of its gross national income to international 
development cooperation. Although still lagging behind France and Germany 
(i.e., two of the largest donor countries by volume), one could interpret Italy’s 
recent increase in development assistance as a positive and encouraging signal 
for the future (see Figure 5). Indeed, ODA rose by US$1.8 billion during the Renzi 
government, with a yearly average increase of 18.2%. Notwithstanding the 
increase, and in this respect Italy is no different from other European countries 
(e.g., Germany and Sweden), the upward trend is artificially produced by the 
costs attributed to the hosting of refugees. Stripping out the funds spent in the 
country for administrative costs, debt relief and refugees, only 37% of bilateral 
aid reached beneficiary countries (Simonelli 2016), whereas more than 20% of 
the whole Italian ODA was accounted for by refugee-related expenses (OECD 
2015). 
 
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In relation to Italy’s financial and military commitment to the European Union 
and the United Nations – i.e., two of the main institutional arenas for 
coordination and cooperation with other countries – the Renzi government’s 
performance was also mixed (Figure 6). On the financial side, relative 
contributions to the EU and UN regular budgets fits a long-term pattern of 
reduced funding that is the result of macro-economic conditions, resource 
projections and attempts at cost management. At the EU level, in particular, 
while the economic performance of some countries – namely Germany and the 
United Kingdom – has resulted in an increase of their payments relative to other 
members, economic stagnation has led Italy to reduce its relative contribution to 
the EU in the last years. The new global economic outlook, moreover, has pushed 
many member states – Italy included – to suggest improvements in efficiency 
and implement funding cuts to the UN’s regular budget.  
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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That said, Italy, which still remains one of the top ten donors to the UN budget, 
has shown itself to be one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping 
operations in terms of military personnel. The number of troops serving in UN 
missions has remained stable over the last five years (Figure 7), with the largest 
contingent in Lebanon (1,073 men at the end of 2016). Similarly, Italy’s 
commitment to EU and NATO missions has been extended and, in some 
instances, it grew considerably during the Renzi government. By December 2016 
Italy had the second largest troop contingent deployed in Afghanistan (n=1,037) 
and Kosovo (n=551) under the NATO-led Resolute Support and Kosovo Force 
missions respectively; it took an active part with its naval units in security 
operations in the Mediterranean Sea (Mare Nostrum, Operation Sea Guardian, 
Mare Sicuro and EUNAVFOR Med) and the Western Indian Ocean (Ocean Shield-
Atlanta); it was a leading member of the multinational coalition fighting Islamic 
State with more than 1,300 military and police trainers deployed in Iraq and 
other neighbouring states as part of Operation Prima Parthica. Although the 
Renzi government refused to join Britain, France, the US and other countries in 
the bombing of Daesh in Syria and Iraq, Italy deployed air units and ground 
troops to carry out reconnaissance missions, safeguard the Mosul Dam project5, 
train local forces and protect the Iraqi cultural heritage. At the end of 2016, Italy 
remarkably maintained the largest troop contingent in the US-led anti-ISIS 
coalition after the United States. Meanwhile, Italy deployed about 300 troops and 
medical operatives as part of the Italian operation Ippocrate to support and 
provide security for a field hospital providing medical care to Libyan fighters 
battling Islamic State in the vicinity of Misurata in the West of Libya. 
 
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
More than Meets the Eye: A Qualitative Assessment of IFP under Renzi 
 
The comparative trends presented above demonstrate the gradual but clear 
impact of Italy’s fiscal and structural constraints on the country’s international 
action. Yet, to provide a comprehensive and balanced assessment of IFP under 
Renzi, the data needs to be contextualised across time and weighed against the 
contemporary realities that are dominating the international system as a whole. 
One also needs to account for other, less visible efforts made by the Renzi cabinet 
during its time in office. This section seeks to compliment the quantitative 
analysis with a qualitative assessment of Italian diplomatic and political 
initiatives in a number of key domains.  
 
While hard to quantify in numbers, current international realities demand a 
return to the hard work of diplomacy, coalition building (and maintenance), 
mediation and multilateralism. As a country that enjoys good relations with 
many pivotal actors in a number of key settings (i.e., the United States, Russia, 
Iran, EU Member States and Middle East and North African countries), Italy does 
enjoy significant potential to act as a facilitator in support of multilateral 
dialogue and consensus building. Positioning Italy to maximise its leverage and 
 9 
visibility within international fora as a means to counterbalance its structural 
and financial weaknesses has therefore represented a traditional objective of 
IFP.  
 
While struggling with the necessity of doing ‘more with less’, the Renzi 
government has combined elements of continuity with some, hesitant but 
nonetheless important, efforts at change. Unless exposed to an existential threat, 
the first priority of any Italian government relates to the domestic political and 
economic sphere, with foreign policy becoming a tool at the service of the 
economic and political interests of the State rather than a means to project force 
or support normative ideals abroad. In this, Renzi has pursued a clear line of 
continuity with regard to previous executives, seeking to maximise the 
attractiveness of Italian exports and of Italy as an investment destination. Italian 
military exports, for instance, have experienced a significant boom over the past 
years, reaching €14.6 billion in 2016, a 85.7% increase compared to the previous 
year (“Boom di export” 2017). 
 
On the other side of the coin, there is little doubt that Italy’s successive cuts to 
the Foreign Ministry budget stand out as the most significant and worrying 
indicator outlined above (-€286 Million net of ODA in the last two legislatures). 
Limited resources and stringent budgetary constraints are impacting all 
European countries. Yet, Italy has been particularly exposed to these challenges 
due to years of limited economic growth, political instability and high deficits. 
Moreover, Italy has been exposed to a number of major challenges unfolding in 
the Mediterranean, and has shouldered a significant burden to save the lives of 
countless migrants and refugees attempting to cross to Europe. Italy’s finances 
have also been hit hard by a series of devastating earthquakes that took place in 
central and northern Italy in August and October 2016, as well as in January 
2017. 
 
In this respect, while cuts to the MFA have progressed under Renzi, the 
indicators displayed above do demonstrate a hesitant reversal of this trend with 
regards to Italian defence spending and, less so, its foreign aid budget. In both 
respects the Renzi government therefore deserves a credit for improvement 
compared to recent executives. The fact that Renzi committed his government to 
progressing these reform efforts is a positive signal and demonstrates an 
understanding of the urgent need to put Italy’s house in order as a means of 
freeing up important resources needed to support the country’s foreign interests 
and concerns. Yet, efforts at budgetary and institutional reform cannot alone be 
sufficient criteria for assessing IFP under Renzi, not least in light of the fact that 
these processes remained very much ‘work in progress’ at the time of Renzi’s 
resignation in December 2016. 
 
A more nuanced assessment can be given by focussing on a number of key areas 
of Italian diplomatic and military action. In this respect, Renzi has continued a 
process that seeks to focus Italy’s limited capital on those areas where the 
country’s vital national interests are most at stake or where an Italian 
contribution is believed to be of particularly significant added value. This was 
the case, for instance, in the realm of anti-piracy and anti-smuggling operations 
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in the Mediterranean as well as in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean, where 
the Italian navy has gained considerable expertise. It is also the case in the 
context of Libya, where Italian diplomacy has been particularly active in support 
of UN efforts to stabilise the country, albeit with somewhat meagre results as of 
December 2016.  
 
Italy has also been active in the diplomatic sphere in the Balkans, another 
traditional priority area of IFP, where successive governments, including that of 
Renzi, have sought to encourage the processes of institutional and political 
reform in the context of the EU’s enlargement policy. Italian efforts in both Libya 
and the Balkans were highlighted by the yearly Scorecard on European Foreign 
Policy published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), with Italy 
being graded as “leader” on both dossiers in the 2016 edition and “leader” on 
Libya in the 2015 edition (ECFR 2015, 2016).  
 
In other, more remote settings, Italian contributions appear to rest on a 
combination of responsibility for past involvement, and therefore to be also a 
means of protecting Italian investments in blood and treasure, and an effort to 
reassure major allies of Italy’s continued reliability as an international partner. 
These instances were more pronounced in such settings as Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Lebanon, where Italian personnel have a long history of activity and yet their 
presence is arguably harder to justify in terms of direct national interests alone. 
 
With regard to Italy’s traditional alliances, the experience of the Renzi 
government followed a clear line of continuity with the past. Relations with 
Barak Obama’s United States were marked by improvements, with the US 
President congratulating Renzi on his ambitious reform programme and even 
hosting him at his last White House reception dinner in October 2016 (“Obama 
rolls out red carpet” 2016). The US-Italian relationship also benefitted from 
Italy’s enthusiastic support for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and from Italy’s commitment to the NATO-led mission in 
Afghanistan. In January 2016, after months of difficult negotiations, Italy also 
allowed the US use of Italian military bases for armed US drone missions over 
Libya. Italy has however remained firm in its insistence that US drones use 
Italian bases only for defensive missions and reconnaissance, not targeted 
killings or offensive action (“L’Italia concede” 2016; “Italy Quietly Agrees” 2016). 
 
A similar debate was held regarding Italy’s contribution to the US-led anti-ISIS 
coalition, with Italy refusing requests by the US and its allies to commence 
offensive operations in Syria and Iraq (“ISIS: Pentagono chiede” 2016). 
Notwithstanding this refusal, as described in the previous section, Italy’s 
contribution to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition has expanded under Renzi. The 
Government’s decision to considerably enhance Italy’s participation in Iraq is 
perhaps the clearest example of the country’s efforts to consolidate its foreign 
and military commitments in areas where economic, political and diplomatic 
returns are expected and closely interrelated. In this respect, the choice to 
dispatch Italian troops to support work on the Mosul Dam can be described as a 
calculated risk that it is hoped will yield economic benefits for an Italian 
company while at the same time providing the Italian government with an 
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opening to secure a place at the top diplomatic table together with key allies 
such as the US, France and the United Kingdom. A similar reading can be given to 
the Government’s decision to dispatch troops and medical specialists to Libya. 
Indeed, and in the broader context of the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, 
Italy’s willingness to assume greater responsibilities appears to have been 
recognised by its allies, with Rome being chosen as the location for the third 
ministerial meeting of the International anti-ISIS Coalition on 2 February 2016 
after previous meetings were held in Paris and London. 
 
At the diplomatic level in Syria, the Renzi government has remained firm in its 
opposition to military measures and supported efforts by the UN envoy for Syria, 
Staffan de Mistura. Italy’s role and visibility did grow in this domain under the 
Renzi government, with Italy being invited to participate in the UN-sponsored 
peace talks on Syria for the first time in late 2014 (Geneva II). In this context, 
Italy had long argued for the necessity of including Iran in diplomatic 
negotiations on the future of Syria, a view that is shared by other actors. Iran was 
ultimately invited to join the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG), which 
met in Vienna in November 2015 and again in February 2016 (European 
External Action Service 2016b).  
 
Italy has also been active in the humanitarian sphere in helping to launch the 
EU’s Regional Trust Fund to coordinate humanitarian aid for the Syrian crisis in 
cooperation with the European Commission. Launched in December 2014 and 
known as the Madad Fund, Italy contributed 3 million euro as founding donor of 
the initiative (“European Commission and Italy” 2014). While lagging behind 
other major European partners, Italian humanitarian contributions in response 
to the Syrian conflict are said to have totalled about €120 million between 2011 
and late 2016 according to Foreign Ministry figures (see “Alfano: 25 milioni di 
euro” 2016). A further $400 million pledge was made by Italy’s Foreign Minister 
during the London Donor Conference for Syria in early February 2016 for the 
period 2016-2018.  
 
In Europe, Italy struggled with certain EU countries on many thorny dossiers – 
fiscal restraint, austerity, the migrant crisis, sanctions on Russia, European 
reform and integration – but on the whole has maintained close relations with 
European leaders in France and Germany, as well as with the UK, both pre-and-
post Brexit. The same cannot be said with the leaders of EU institutions which 
have been criticised repeatedly by Renzi and his ministers – and more so by the 
Italian opposition – for not doing enough to support European recovery, respond 
to the refugee and migrant crisis or accord Italy more flexibility when it comes to 
the deficit. In return, and on more than one occasion, these EU representatives 
have expressed pungent criticism of Italy’s finances and reform programmes, 
contributing to an atmosphere of confrontation that reached a peak in the 
months leading up to Italy’s December 2016 constitutional referendum (Greco 
and Ronzitti 2016:11-41).  
 
A major issue of contention with Europe revolved around the migrant and 
refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. Italy has repeatedly called on Europe to 
show more solidarity and help shoulder some of the burden in running search 
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and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. In this context, between October 
2013 and 2014 Italy spent a total of €114 million to fund the Mare Nostrum 
mission in the Mediterranean (Marrone and Nones 2015: 122). The operation 
was discontinued with the launching of the FRONTEX Triton mission in 
November 2014, which however had fewer staff and was less funded than the 
Italian-led mission. Finally, in April 2015, following a significant rise in the 
number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean, EU leaders agreed to expand the 
Triton mission, providing it with similar resources compared to the previous 
Mare Nostrum operation (“Two more migrant boats” 2015). Italy, meanwhile, 
also launched a second naval and reconnaissance mission in March 2015, known 
as Mare Sicuro, which is presently working in parallel with the EU NAVFOR MED 
mission launched in June 2015. Now in its third phase, EU NAVFOR MED is 
headquartered in Rome and the Italian Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino holds 
operational command, while Rear Admiral Andrea Gueglio is Force Commander 
and head of the operation’s flagship vessel, the Italian Aircraft Carrier Cavour.  
 
While repeatedly calling on Europe to do more, and pushing hard for the 
ultimately unsuccessful EU refugee quota system that was approved in 
September 2015, Italy has found itself in the difficult situation of having to 
shoulder an important part of the manpower, financial and logistical burden of 
the migrant and refugee crises in the Mediterranean. By December 2016, only 
5% of the promised 160,000 migrants had been relocated from Greece and Italy 
to other EU countries (“EU met only 5%” 2016; UNHCR 2016), figures that only 
served to increase Italian protests vis-à-vis EU institutions and other Member 
States. 
 
On the whole, therefore, while the Government may deserve good marks for 
effort and initiative, the choice of strategy, sequencing and implementation of 
these reforms remains problematic. In this respect, Renzi’s ambitious persona 
and reform plans quickly fell prey to Italy’s turbulent and fractured domestic 
politics, diluting the scope of a number of attempts at reform while slowing their 
actual implementation. Ultimately, and as has been the case with previous Italian 
executives, domestic constraints of a political, economic and institutional nature 
would combine to limit the effectiveness of Renzi’s reform agenda, both foreign 
and domestic. Indeed, many of the initiatives overseen by Renzi yielded only 
limited results or remained ‘work in progress’ at the time of his resignation in 
December 2016. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As a highly ambitious politician, Renzi is known for refusing to shy away from 
confrontation. Yet, excesses of confidence and a tendency to neglect his political 
opponents both near and far ultimately led to his downfall as Italy’s Prime 
Minister. By gambling on a controversial constitutional reform package that was 
voted down in a popular referendum on 4 December 2016, Renzi was 
unceremoniously forced to resign, to be replaced by his close ally and former 
Foreign Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, who subsequently formed another 
government.  
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The abrupt end to Renzi’s three-year premiership necessarily makes any 
assessment of his impact on IFP partial and incomplete, notwithstanding the fact 
that the subsequent government clearly affirmed its intention to continue 
Renzi’s agenda6. While Renzi placed the country on a more solid track of 
institutional and budgetary reform, much remains to be done, not least an effort 
at actually implementing and carrying through the many reform plans 
announced by Renzi.  
 
That said, it is clear that Renzi has shown himself to be a more proactive leader 
compared to his two immediate predecessors, as well as his successor. 
Benefitting from consolidated support in Parliament and a clearer political 
mandate to act in foreign and security policy, Renzi, known as the ‘rottamatore’ 
(loosely translated as ‘the scrapper’) took it upon himself to inject a much 
needed dose of self-confidence and ambition into Italy’s political debate and 
international initiatives. 
 
Modelled on the example of Barack Obama, who Renzi has often described as the 
most inspiring contemporary leader, Italy’s youngest Prime Minister has tried, 
with mixed results, to change Italy’s engrained culture of complaining and 
political deadlock, seeking to address a whole number of institutional, political 
and economic challenges that have long plagued Italy’s reputation abroad. In this 
respect, Renzi has sought – at one and the same time – to reform Italy’s 
constitution and electoral law; reorganise and speed up the on-going reform of 
Italy’s foreign, defence and aid budgets; clarify the guidelines for Italy’s 
participation in international missions abroad; position Italy as a major force 
contributor in the US-led anti-ISIS coalition while resisting requests to deviate 
from Italy’s long-standing policy of non-intervention; establish and consolidate a 
position for Italy as a key diplomatic player in the context of Libya; and become a 
major voice in Europe for a cooperative approach to the migrant and refugee 
crises in the Mediterranean.  
 
On top of these issues, Italy under Renzi also emerged as a strong voice in 
Europe calling for a more flexible approach to the financial recovery, insisting on 
the need for more investment and less austerity (“Renzi: ‘Europe has taken’” 
2016). In this Renzi found an important supporter in the Italian head of the 
European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, who embarked on a programme of 
quantitative easing to help struggling European countries reach economic 
recovery. Italy has also emerged as a key European voice supporting debates for 
enhanced integration among EU states in the realm of defence, security, R&D and 
procurement strategies as a means to better exploit resources, share expertise 
and limit unnecessary duplication.  
 
Banking on those sectors where Italy does have some important added value – 
ample expertise in peacekeeping and multilateral initiatives; naval search, rescue 
and reconnaissance operations; good relations with Arab and Muslim states as 
well as with Israel, the United States and Russia; and a wide array of existing and 
potential economic opportunities in the energy, construction and service sectors 
across the Southern Mediterranean – seems to be the most efficient avenue to 
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protect, and eventually enhance, Italy’s international visibility while stimulating 
a domestic recovery. Indeed, while Italy’s increased participation in military 
missions abroad can be framed as a continuation of the country’s tendency to 
bandwagon with larger allies, the Renzi government’s activism in Libya and on 
the migration and refugee crisis do stand out as two of its major contributions to 
IFP.         
 
One major criticism that can be levelled against Renzi and his cabinet is that they 
tried to do too much at once, at times appearing to neglect political opponents or 
the complexity of the issues at hand. In the drive to produce concrete results on 
numerous parallel issues, Renzi unwillingly sowed the seeds of his own downfall. 
His signature reform package, the electoral law and constitutional reform, was 
criticised by many as rushed and unclear, with Renzi himself admitting that a 
better job could have been done (“Renzi: ‘Più soldi,” 2016; “PD in assemblea” 
2016).  
 
Paradoxically perhaps, while ultimately costing him his premiership, Renzi’s 
drive to ‘get the job done’ provided Italy with somewhat greater visibility on the 
international stage. He oversaw the first major increases in Italian defence 
spending in almost a decade, and Italy has received praise from many quarters 
for its humanitarian actions in the Mediterranean. Italy has also enhanced its 
credentials as an important US ally in Europe while, however, remaining firm in 
its refusal to engage in offensive military action in Iraq, Syria and Libya. At the 
same time, in two of these theatres – Iraq and Libya – Italy has demonstrated its 
ability to make difficult choices and to respond quickly to international crises. In 
2014, Italy was among the first European countries to respond to the call for 
assistance by Iraqi authorities and the Kurdish Regional Government on the 
front line with ISIS by sending light weapons and ammunition (Greco and 
Ronzitti 2016: 93-101). Since then, the Italian troop contingent in Iraq and the 
broader anti-ISIS coalition has grown to be the largest after the United States’, no 
small feat for a ‘middle power’ with stringent political and financial constraints 
at home.  
 
While one can debate the strategy and usefulness of Italian commitments in 
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations, there is little doubt that Italy 
under Renzi has not skirted its responsibilities vis-à-vis its international allies 
and has backed these alliances with muscle and diplomatic support. Libya has 
been perhaps the most complex and problematic theatre of Italian involvement 
under Renzi, and also the one where both qualitative and quantitative 
measurements can only go so far in providing an assessment of IFP. While 
investing diplomatic, financial and military capital in the Libyan conflict, Renzi 
left power with little to show for the investment, which also, no doubt, carries 
real security risks for Italy. Yet, with much secrecy and little fanfare, Italy’s 
contribution in Libya may still bear fruit.  
 
In January 2017 Italy announced that it would become the first Western country 
to re-open an embassy in Libya two years after its original closure (“Italy 
reopening embassy” 2017). Three months later, in April 2017, unexpected news 
hit the international headlines: Italy had successfully brokered an agreement 
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between Libya’s warring sides at a secret meeting in Rome (“Libya’s warring 
sides” 2017). While it is too early to tell if the agreement will hold and help pave 
the way for further diplomatic talks as well as a real push for a political 
agreement between Tripoli and Tobruk, the meeting goes to show that quiet 
diplomacy, if sufficiently supported by strong political will and some military 
muscle, still has the potential to pay off. 
 
In light of Italy’s multilateral vocation and good relations with key international 
actors who often disagree with each other, policy makers would be best advised 
to seek to steer a middle course between East and West, North and South, 
seeking to provide expertise and added value in building more cooperative 
relations among major state actors. It is perhaps an accident of history that Renzi 
will not be leading Italy in this capacity during 2017-2018, a period when Rome 
will be put to the test in a variety of international forums. In 2017, Italy will hold 
the rotating presidency of the G7; it will Chair the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mediterranean Contact Group and will have a seat 
on the UNSC (for one year). Following that, in 2018, Italy will assume the 
Chairmanship of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, another institutional role that 
could be used by Italy’s leaders as a platform to maximise the country’s 
international influence and leverage while balancing the country’s still 
significant domestic and structural constraints.  
 
Italian politics have not seen the last of Matteo Renzi. The ‘scrapper’ is likely to 
be back in a leadership position in the not too distant future. Having secured re-
election as head of the PD in the April 2017 primaries with almost 70% of the 
vote, Renzi is positioning himself to make a comeback as Prime Minister in the 
next national elections, tentatively scheduled for 2018. While Renzi’s first stint 
as Prime Minister did not end well, forcing him to abandon Italy’s helm at a time 
when many of his domestic and institutional reforms remained incomplete, his 
ambition and political drive are not likely to dissipate.  
 
Renzi’s legacy is presently being carried forward by his less charismatic ally and 
former Foreign Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, ensuring that when Renzi makes his 
comeback, Italy’s citizens and international allies will again no doubt notice a 
significant change of rhetoric and tone from Rome. Yet citizens, as much as 
international allies, will soon expect concrete and quantifiable results from 
Italy’s lengthy process of seemingly open-ended reform. The country’s ability to 
weather the financial crisis and emerge in this new and convoluted international 
setting with increased self-confidence and resolve will ultimately depend on 
these results. Whoever leads Italy in the near future, domestic politics and the 
economic recovery will no doubt dominate the Government’s agenda. What 
remains to be seen is if Italy will be able to justify and consolidate its many 
foreign and security engagements in such a way as to strengthen and support 
this ultimate, fundamental goal. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Defence expenditure at current and constant 2010 prices and 
exchange rates, 2008-2016 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of NATO defence expenditure data. 
Defence expenditures do not include pensions. Figures for 2016 are estimates. 
 
 
Figure 2 Defence expenditure: share of GDP and annual real change based on 
2010 prices, 2008-2016 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of NATO defence expenditure data. 
Defence expenditures do not include pensions. Figures for 2016 are estimates. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of defence expenditure by category, 2008-2016 (%) 
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	
60	
70	
80	
90	
100	
2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016e	
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
	
Equipment(a)		
France	
Germany	
Italy	
United	Kingdom	
 
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	
60	
70	
80	
90	
100	
2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016e	
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
	
Personnel(b)		
France	
Germany	
Italy	
United	Kingdom	
 
0	
5	
10	
15	
20	
2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016e	
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
	
Infrastructure(c)	
France	
Germany	
Italy	
United	Kingdom	
 
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
50	
60	
70	
80	
90	
100	
2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016e	
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
	
Other(d)	
France	
Germany	
Italy	
United	Kingdom	
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of NATO defence expenditure data.  
Defence expenditures do not include pensions. Figures for 2016 are estimates. 
(a) Equipment expenditure includes major equipment expenditure and R&D devoted to major 
equipment; 
(b) Personnel expenditure includes military and civilian expenditure and pensions; 
(c) Infrastructure expenditure includes NATO common infrastructure and national military 
construction; 
(d) Other expenditure includes operations and maintenance expenditure, other R&D expenditure 
and expenditure not allocated among above-mentioned categories.  
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Figure 4 Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (net of ODA), 2008-2016 
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Sources: Authors’ elaboration of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Statistical Yearbook) data. 
 
 
Figure 5 Official Development Assistance, 2008-2015 
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Sources: Authors’ elaboration of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Statistical Yearbook) data; 
OECD. 
 
 
Figure 6 Contribution to the EU and UN budgets, 2008-2016 
  
Sources: Authors’ elaboration of EU Commission (2008-2014) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2015-2016) data; UN Committee on Contributions. 
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Figure 7 Contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, 2008-2016 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from UN Peacekeeping archives. 
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1 This number also includes Italy’s operation Mare Sicuro, launched in March 
2015. In total, including military missions on Italian territory, Italy was 
participating in 31 military missions with about 14,400 personnel by the end of 
2016 (Source: Italian Ministry of Defence).  
2 It has to be noted that the last time a similar document was produced by Italy’s 
military top brass was in 1986, in itself an indication of the Renzi government’s 
willingness to redress Italian institutional shortcomings in this domain (Greco 
and Ronzitti 2016: 47-55). 
3 Remarkably, Italy and Germany spend about the same percentage of GDP on 
defence (see Figure 2).  
4 In the case of France and the United Kingdom, equipment costs include nuclear 
weapons. 
5 Italian soldiers patrol the area north of Mosul, protecting the employees of the 
Trevi Group, the Italian company awarded the contract to repair Iraq’s largest 
dam – the fourth largest in the Middle East.  
6 This was particularly evident in the areas of defence and economic policy. Both 
the Defence Minister, Roberta Pinotti, and the Minister for the Economy and 
Finance, Pier Carlo Padoan, retained their posts under the Gentiloni government. 
